Introduction
Bernard Lewis's balanced and well-written history, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, includes a sensitive account of the struggle for Westernizing reform in the declining Ottoman Empire vvhich vvas ended in 1950 election in the republican period of Turkey. Levvis also gives very dramatic explanations about national and international transition of Turkey after the World War II:
Many explanations have been offered. Turkish cynics -vvho are very cynical, say that the whole thing vvas due to a miscalculation. (...) Such an explanation seems superficial and unsatisfactory. (...) Foreign cynics and some Turks, attribute these changes to a desire to place the West, and especially the Americans. (...) In foreign policy, at least Turkey has identified herself fully and unreservedly vvith the West. Did this mean that the advance tovvards democracy inside the country vvas no more than a reflection at home of a policy pursued abroad or, to put it more crudely, a piece of vvindovv-dressing designed to please and flatter Turkey's Western allies?
No doubt the desire to impress and w in över the West had its place among the motives that impclled İsmet İnönü to relax the authoritarian regime in 1945. (...) Hovvever, it vvould be a grave error to conclude from this that these various stages of Turkish reform vvere no more than diplomatic subterfuges. The rulers of Turkey vvere not likely to change their form of government and surrender povver to an opposition, merely to please a foreign state. In addition, if they did not knovv it from the start, they must soon have realized that the extension of democratic liberties in Turkey vvould have only a limited influence on a decision in Washington to help or abandon them. (...)
A more exUeme form of the theory of American influence is the attribution of the change the direct American intervention. There is no doubt that American pressure vvas cxcrtcd rather strongly in favor of private enterprise and against etatism, and the moves of the People's Party government in this direction vvere no doubt in large measure to the terms of American loans and the advice of American advisers. There is, hovvever, no evidence supporting the theory of direct American action in favor of political change. The most that can be said is that they helped to create a favorable atmosphere (...)
The transfer of povver by a free election vvas certainly a bloodless revolution, comparable, in its vvay, vvith the revolutions of 1876, 1908, and 1923 . Hovvever, it soon became apparent that once again, it vvas something less than the millcnium. Peasants, taxi men, and others who had shown an excess of zeal in their interpretation of democracy duly received a lesson in political science. Policemen breathed again, and swung their truncheons with covered that after ali a few obstacles stili remained on Turkey's path of progress and freedom. According to Rustow, the period from 1947 to the early 1960 was one of almost full convergcnce of Amcrican and Turkish policy. Turkey had found the strong outside support needed to resists the Soviets över the long haul; and American polieymakers, eager to line up reluetant nations in Europe or Asia for defensive pacts such as NATO and SEATO, found the Turks an enthusiastic ally.
5 When American forces came to the aid of South Korea in 1950, Turkey was among the few countries to respond eagerly to the UN's cali for troops; and its foreign minister, Professor Fuad Köprülü, justifıed the step with what remains a classic statement of the case for collective security: "If I do not give up help today, how can I dare ask the United Nations for help whcn I am in need of it tomorrow? " For it's past, Washington strongly supported, över some European objeetions, the admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO, completed in 1952. 6 Rustow also provides a preliminary analysis of the TurkishAmerican relation's in early Cold War period:
From early days of the Cold War, Ankara's and Washington's strategic analysts were agreed that Turkey and Greece formed an indispensable barrier to Soviet moves around Europe's southern flank into the 1 6
Mediterranean. Once Congress had accepted the principle of Tnıman's containment policy, it becamc easier to subsume the mounting sums for Greek and Turkish aid under the general European rubric than to fight separates annual battles of appropriations. One result thus has been that Turkey in the past four decades has become one of the steadiest recipients of US military and economic aid -its grand total exceeded only by Britain and France, South Korea and South Vietnam, and, most recenüy, Egypt and Israel. 
Political-Military Ties During the Cold War
Another crucial decision was the establishment of close political-military ties with the West, to which economic tie was soon added. This decision grew out of post-war Russian pressure on Turkey to cede tcrritory in eastern Anatolia and grand bases on the Turkish Straits. It vvas into this extremely backvvard military machine that the United States began to pour nevv equipment -artillery, trucks, tanks and fighter aircraft-vvhich vvere designed to help Turkey to fulfil her commitments to the Western alliancc. In 1950 and mainly as a means of increasing pressure on the Western povvers to allovv her accession to NATO, Turkey dispatched a mixcd bridge of 4,000 men to join the UN force in the Korean War. The Turkish troops in Korea certainly distinguished themselves in combat, but it vvas clear that only the best-trained troops vvere being sent to Far East and that the condition of the army at home vvas far from perfect. Nevv equipment vvithout better training and more rapid promotion for those vvho had achieved it vvas pointless. At the beginning of the 1952, it vvas reported that 40-50 percent of ali American-supplied military vehicles vvas out-of orders, due to lack of maintenance. The problem vvas only overcame by the dispatch of American-manned fields teams, vvho oversavv improvemenis in training and reported directly to the General Staff in Ankara.
The American military authorities also promoted a massive reform military education system. Nevv schools vvere establishcd for spccial training in aircraft gunnery, signals, medicine, ordinance, transport and engineering in the army, for mine and submarine vvarfare in the navy, and pilot uaining, radio aeronautics and meteorology in the air force, besides several other technical branches. Feroz Ahmad has parallel views; "inside NATO the character of Turkey's offıcer corps began to change. Younger offıcer, who were open the technology and the strategy of modern warfare, acquired a sense of importance and confidence they had never enjoyed before. They visited other countries and discussed the world's problems vvith offıcers vvho presented perspectives different from their ovvn." 
Einsenhovver-Dulles Administration and Turkey
The Republican Party, after tvventy years in the political vvilderness, thus had a golden opportunity to use the promise of peace in Korea, vvhich most Americans vvanted, in their 1952-election campaign. Coming on top of their good fortune in obtaining Dvvight Eisenhovver, the Suprcme Allied commander in the World War and later of NATO, and the country's most popular military figüre, as their presidential candidate, this put the Republicans in an almost invinciblc position. After the expected victory dully occurred, Presidcnt Eisenhovver proceeded to honor his electoral promise of negotiating a peace in Korea, emphasized by a symbolic trip to the vvartorn country. After nearly three years of conflict, the result vvas the not unexpected return to the original partition boundary of the thirty-eighth parallel.
14 The Korean settlement vvas only one aspect of a changed emphasis in American foreign policy. The Republican Party had traditionally been less concerned about involvement overseas, being more closely identifıed vvith the 'isolationist impulse', vvhich had a long and proud tradition in the United States. Although there vvas no question of a vvithdravval from Europe -for example, the Republicans continued to press hard for Gcrman rearmament-, there vvas a less intense concern vvith European affairs. Many European leaders vvelcomed this change in American foreign policy. For one thing, they felt that Eisenhower, who had twice been their military commander, could be trusted not to treat the European commitment too lightly. On the other hand, their improving economies were leading Western European states toward a feeling that they ought to have more political independence, and that the continent should not cling so closely to American coat l ails. If the United States had maintained the same high degree of involvement in European affairs as in the 1940s, the mid-1950s might well have seen several clashes of will between the two sides of the Atlantic. As it was, such a disagreement was delayed until de Gaulle re-emerged in France as the champion of an old-fashioned pride in nationalism and anti-American resentment.
However, the new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who in many ways was more important than President Eisenhower as the arehiteet of American foreign policy in the 1950s, was convinced that the military aspect overwhclmed everything else, which the Cold War as played by the Soviet Union was just a new variant of traditional power politics. He believed that the United States should avoid another Korea, but where confrontation was unavoidable, then the venue should be picked by, and when is favorable to, the United States. From this thinking, there developed the concept of massive retaliation.
The effects of this American foreign policy were paradoxical. There was a tendeney to prefer remaining more aloof from foreign contact, yet simultancously seeking to project a more positive and aggressive image. It was the nuclear issue, which had rendered Western European Union irrelevant in the 1950s. The development of Soviet nuclear capacity had very largely invalidated much of the strategic thinking on the defense of the Westem Europe: It was improbable that a war in Europe could now be fought only with conventional ground troops. In the late 1950s, the United States and NATO had to reconsider the role and organization of the latter. On the other hand, NATO The successful visit to the United States in February of this year of President Bayar of Turkey, at President Eisenhovver's invitation, has highlightcd one of the most significant political events of our timesTurkey's emergence as a full and responsible member of the Western alliance. The increasingly elose relations that started vvith the initiation of large-scale American aid to Turkey in 1947 have created a bond of confidence and respect betvveen both the governments and the peoples of the tvvo countries and have revealed a remarkable similarity in national aims and policies. Until fairly recently there existed a certain amount of anti-Turkish sentiment in this country. It arose largely out of the Ottoman Empire's association vvith the Central Povvers during the First World War and its handling of the Armenian problem, but it vvas reinforced by some misinterpretation of the Turkish history and a good deal of ignorance about events there since 1919. Today the American attitude is quite changed. Turkey is rightly considered one of our most reliable partners, and fevv nations enjoy so much prestige in this country. Following the Suez crisis in 1956, the US formulated a special policy in order to control the growing rapproachment betvveen the Soviet Union, Egypt and Syria. 21 Known as "Eisenhovver Doctrine", 22 this new policy had been sent to the Congress as a message of the President on January 5, 1957 and vvas accepted by Congress on March 9.
According to Fahir Armaoğlu, there vvere tvvo things that can be done under these conditions by the US. One vvas to strengthen the friendly rcgional states by extending them economic aid. The other vvas to explain vvhat communist hegemony can produce and to assist them to resist international communism either by bilateral or multilateral relationships. 23 In connection vvith this nevv policy against Soviet expansion and international communism, Eisenhovver Doctrine increased the importance of the Turkey in the eyes of the Washington. The US vvanted to reinforce its military forces in the Near East to implement the doctrine effectively. The establishment of air bases to aid the transportation of the troops into Europe vvas a necessary measure for such an action. Treaty between the two states. Two developments that are more important had taken place in the region before the signing of the Treaty. The first one was the Syria crisis in 1957 and the second one was Iraq revolution in 1958. Both of them equally effected the Turkey. The Syria crisis was a reflection of power struggle between the two blocks in the Near East, which began in the aftermath of the Second World War and deepened step by step later.
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One of the outstanding consequences of the pro-Naser Iraq revolution beginning with the overthrown of the King Faisal on July 14, 1958, was the application of the Eisenhovver Doctrine to the developments in a country for the first time. Iraq was the basic cornerstone of the British and American Middle Eastern policies due to Iraq's strategic position as a bridge between the Arab World and Northern Bank and the its oil fields.
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According to July 28, 1959 London Declaration, the US would make "security and defense" agreements with the Baghdad Pact members and would offıcially participate to the Organization, later named as CENTO (Central Treaty Organization) by bilateral agreements. To illustrate, March 5, 1959 Turkish-American Bilateral Cooperation Agreement was a result of that policy. 28 Causing severe debates later in Turkey, this agreement was the direct practice of the Eisenhovver Doctrine, which was announced to protect the countries under the threat of the Soviet Union in the Near East. Furthcrmore, an article indicating the US military and economic aid conditions to Turkey's economic recovery was put into the agreement as well. According to the Agreement, in the case of direct or indirect attack, the US would provide military aid to 26 Turkey, as happened in the case of Lebanon. 29 As Sander points out, although the same guarantee vvas given against secret and destroying activities, there vvasn't any extreme leftist movement forcing Menderes government to take serious measures, or any minority uprising. Dangers, vvhich could be possible for Iran and Pakistan, vvere not valid for Turkey. 30 It is not possible to clearly affirm that Menderes government demanded the article "indirect attack" put into the Agreement in order to use it against the opposition inside the country. It is probable that not political but mainly economic concerns forced the Turkish government to sign this agreement. Besides, it vvas this concern that forced Prime Minister Menderes, vvho had lost his hopes for the US assistance, to make plans later on to play the Soviet Union card.
The Crisis of Turkey and Emerging Relations vvith the USSR
In mid-1950s, vvhen the first term of the office of the Democrats in the US vvas coming to an end, the Menderes government in Turkey found itself facing serious economic difficulties. These stemmed from the desirc of Democrats to do too much in a short period of time, the lack of viability of a number of projccts, the shortage of foreign exchange, the inadequacy of foreign and private Turkish capital, bad erops and fluetuations in international trade. By 1958, mismanagement of the economy had brought Turkey to bankruptey. In exchange for a package of loans from vvestern Europe, the United States, and the international organizations, the Democrat İcadership vvas obliged to accept an anti-inflationary program. Even at that time, hovvever, rumblings could be heard in the economic as vvell as in the political sphere. Auspicious interpretations of the Turkish economy, serious vveaknesses existed vvhich vvere to become increasingly evident. Turkey's trade balance remained unfavorable, her foreign debt vvas enormous, and inflation persisted due to inability to meet the consumption demands of the Turkish people. In the latter part of 1959, of 51 state enterprises conducted by the Menderes regime, 19 vvere operating at a loss partly because of bad judgment and misjudgment.
32
By the late 1950s, Menderes no longer controlled the economy. Hovvever, he vvas sure that his problems vvere temporary and that his policies vvould begin to show results vvithin a fevv years. He vvanted to have time vvith help of his friends, espccially those in Washington and Bonn. In July 1958, the Western povvers announced their program to rescue the Turkish economy and the Menderes government. They had to provide Ankara vvith loan of 359 million dollar and the consolidation of Turkey's 400 milliondollar debt. In return, Menderes vvas asked to 'stabilize' the economy by taking certain measures, the most important being the devaluation of the lira from 2.80 to 9.025 liras to one US dollar. The 'rescue operation' by itself proved ineffeetive Menderes lacked the confidence to take unpopular measures necessary to stabilize the economy. A year later, in October 1959, he vvent to America hoping that the ally he had served vvith such loyalty vvould help in his hour of need. Finance Minister Hasan Polatkan had gone on ahead to prepare the ground for an aid package of 5 to 6 hundred million dollars. Hovvever, President Eisenhovver by novv had lost ali hope in the Menderes government and refused to bail him out. Menderes returned to Ankara empty handcd and disheartened. At that point, Menderes, hitherto a totally unrepentant Cold Warrior decided to visit the Soviet Union in follovving July. This decision vvas ali the more remarkable because during the course of his US tour, he had constantly vvarned his American audiences not to be deceived by Soviet overtures, for such an enemy, he vvarned, vvas not to be trusted. When the Menderes vvas overthrovvn in May 1960, the economy vvas in a state of collapse. As Suat Bilge points out, the official statement vvas not clear enough if Turkey vvanted to reorganize its relationship vvith the Soviet Union due to its economic concerns. 35 Neverthcless, Turkey's incipient political crisis came to a head in the spring of 1960. During 1959, there had been serious signs that the government, or some of its supporters, might be planning to reestablish a single-party regimc, even to murder the leadcr of the opposition. İsmet İnönü, vvho vvas already 75 years old, certainly had plenty of enemies in Turkey. 36 Fevv vvill dissent from the vievv that Menderes performed some valuable services for Turkish economic development. Road building and other 'infra-strueture' 34 Zeki Kuneralp, Sadece Diplomat (Only a Diplomat), İstanbul, İstanbul M., 1981, pp. 108-111. 35 A. Suat Bilge, Güç Komşuluk (Difficult Neighboorhood), Ankara, Türkiye İş Bankası, 1992, p. 345.
projects, however, över extended his activities in relation to available resources, with the result that inflation became a serious problem. He succeeded in continuing to get massive foreign aid, especially from the United States. In 1958 the situation almost reached a breaking point, and in order to get himself bailed out with a substantial amount of financial assistance, Menderes agreed to the term of a Stabilization Program set down by the International Monetary Fund, the chief partner in a composite loan totaling some 359 million dollars. Menderes' implementation of both the letter and spirit of the Stabilization Program was sluggish, however. By 1960, many of shortages of consumer goods -including, for an extended period, an almost total absence of the Turkish coffee-had eased, but the National Unity Committee also found that Menderes had already run through practically the entire Stabilization Loan. starts. 40 The coup against Menderes in May 1960 had been in the making since the early-1950s. The developing crises in the second half of the decade had brought togethcr several factions within the Army in their general criticisms of the regime. 41 The sequence of events leading fınally to the May 27 coup began about six months earlier. The opposition began to devise new ways of defying the government, and the latter vvas forced to more and more drastic measures. Probably the greatest blunder of Menderes vvas bringing the army in to quell political disturbances. The Chief of the General Staff, General Rüştü Erdelhun, seems to have convinced the Prime Minister as vvell as himself that the army vvould remain loyal to the government. Even had the army not been brought in directly, hovvever, it vvas unlikely that it vvould have remained aloof much longer in the midst of the vvorsening political situation.
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On the other hand, it seems certain that the Chief of the General Staff, General Erdelhun had assured Adnan Menderes, that the army vvould stay loyal to the regime. According to his later testimony, the Prime Minister tried to resign several times before 27 May but vvas prevented from doing so by President Bayar. Certainly, Bayar vvas not one to give up vvithout a fıght. At the time of his arrest on 27 May he argued ftercely vvith his captors and even pulled out a pistol, threatening suicide. The evidence thus suggests that members of the government, including Adnan Menderes, vvere probably avvare of danger of a coup, but that General Erdelhun and President Bayar quelled their anxieties 43 The "revolution" of May 27 vvas completed vvithin four hours. Strategic spots vvere secured, 44 the President, Prime Minister, and cabinet taken into 'protective custody,' and military commanders placed in charge of the areas in vvhich they vvere stationed. Immediately after they seized povver on the morning of 27 May, the armed forces announced to the Turkish people and the world that; "We are loyal to ali our alliances and undertakings. We believe in NATO and CENTO and we are faithful to them".
In general, public opinion in the West does not seem to have been much concemed about Turkey's internal political situation at this time. Menderes did not appear to have enjoyed a substantial body of support abroad, and there vvas little public outcry in Western Europe to the effect that the 27 May coup had violated democratic principles. In the early 1960s, the American view on 1960 Turkish "revolution" vvas very realistic. 47 One of the American political scientist, Walter F. Weiker, vvho resided in Turkey for about 18 months -six months preceding the coup and for a year after it-and who has studied subsequent developments carefully, has vvritten an analysis of the fıve political problems that come to head during or because of the military takeover. His monograph deseribes the efforts of the military regime to return Turkey to the path of 45 Ibid., p. 120. 46 Ibid" pp. 124-125. 47 Fortunately, the fallacy of these conccrns was demonstrated in the first hours of the May 27 revolution, when the armed forces made it fully clear that Turkish commitments to NATO and CENTO were in no way affected, and in the months follovving Menderes' ouster. Ali civilian political elements also demonstrated that they had no intention of doing anything that might vveaken Turkish firmness against the colossus of the North. On the contrary, it vvas the military regime that became the first to undertake such projects as building radio stations in Eastern Turkey to counter Russian propaganda that for many years had had a virtual monopoly of radio access to the most undeveloped Turkish provinces.
Another dilemma of American policy is the problem of contact vvith the political opposition groups. The Menderes government especially in the later part of its decade of rule, discouraged official relationships betvveen foreign diplomats and leaders of the Republican People's Party. It is; of course, true that diplomats are accredited to the government of the host country, and might be abusing their privileges by defying express or strongly implied vvishes of that government about the behavior of the diplomats. It is precisely in a bipolar situation like that of Turkey before 1960, hovvever, that acquaintance vvith opposition thinking is most important.
(...) It is precisely because of these many material and ideological ties to the West that the United States has potentially great leverage in demanding the best possible use of its aid. The vveapon so often used by developing nations, the threat to turn to the Soviet block, is of virtually no relevance in the Turkish case. History and ideology make it unlikely that, under present conditions, Turkey would succumb even to the most tempting Soviet offers. It is also highly improbable that Russia vvould offer terms of aid or support for Turkey for anything less than neutralization of the Straits, a point on which Turkey has said repeatedly that it would not even consider yielding.
(...) A concurrent complaint of the Turkish opposition to Menderes was that the United States did not use its leverage to persuade Menderes to ease his repressive political policies. In this area the line between legitimate American concern for Turkey's political health in order that development may take place most efficiently and effectively, and 'interference in Turkey internal affairs' is more imprecise than in the strictly economic sphere. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the Menderes regime was nudged or urged to practice the democratic values that Turkey as a self-styled Western nation has preached.
Opportunities as well as problems for the United States arose during the NUC period. From the American point of vievv civilian, multiparty politics is normally preferable to military rule. Yet, there are possibly some distinet advantages of regimes that are not multiparty -military as well as civilian-in certain circumstances. Turkey, among other countries, has had difficulty for many years in achieving under a multiparty system some of the things that economists generally consider basic to enabling it to move from the 'take off platform into a stage of increasingly domestic-generated development. Tax reform, for instance, was undertaken by the NUC, although for reasons discussed earlier it was not effectively implemented.
(...) Admittedly the United States cannot look with benign approval on military usurpation of power from democratically eleeted governments. There are many cases, however, when the United States is either unable to prevent such an occurrence, or where the armed forces come to povver for reasons that might be considered more acceptable, for example, overthrow of a government that is not democratic. Military regimes in developing countries are of a wide variety: short-term transitional, long-term, transitional, in search of merely administrative reform, revolution from bottom to top, liberal, totalitarian, or right or left wing. Research is beginning to show a variety of tasks that such regimes have attempted, either successfully or unsuccessfully, and that have had varying effects on such issues as popular participation in politics, the growth of interest groups, political parties, local government, and economic development. 
